Abstract restriction 011 not repeating challcngcs can be removed usThis paper describes a technique that exploits the statistical delay variations of wires and transistors across ICs to build a secret key unique t o each IC. To explore its feasibility: we fabricated a candidate circuit to generate a response based on its delay characteristics. We show that there exists enough delay variation across ICs implementing the proposed circuit t o identify individual ICs. Further, the circuit functions reliably over a practical range of environmental variation such as temperature and voltage.
Introduction
Secret keys are essential to many emerging applications such as iiitcllcctual property protection aiid software licensing as well as conventional ID cards and smart cards. However, storing secret information in digital form is known to be vuhierahle to invasive physical attacks as well as non-invasive attacks that discover internal connections or charges [l] .
As an alternative we propose Physical Unclonablc Func- tions (PUFs)'; which extract a secret key from hiddcn timing or delay information rather than digit,al information. While ICs can be reliably mass-manufactured to have identical digital functionality, it is well known that each IC is uniquc in its delay characteristics due to inherent manufacturing variations. We exploit this statistical delay variation of transistors and wires across ICs to build secret information unique t o each IC. A simple application illustrates our technique. A particular circuit, that we term a PUF; is fabricated on multiple IC's. Given an IC with a PUF on it, we apply a set of secret inputs (challenges) to the PUF aiid observe the outputs (responses), which depend on the delays of excited paths in the PUF. The set of challenge-response pairs are known to the "lock" and the P U F itself is t,he "key." When a key is presented to a lock, the lock queries the key for the response t o a particular challenge. If the key responds correctly, the lock opens, otherwise it does not. For security reasons, no challenge is repeated. We will argue in this paper that by using simple circuits fabricated using conventional manufacturing technology, we can create a key that canriot be cloned. (\Ye note that the irig the notion of a controlled PUF; the interested reader is referred to [ 5 ] . ) We will assume that the adversary cannot guess the challenges that correspond to the lock -these can be stored in a remote secure location, and only sent to the physical lock on demand. An adversary with physical access to a PUF key implemented on an IC can try to clone the PUF using a variety of different attacks. We describe these attacks and argue that they will not be successful in a later section.
Delay of a wire or a transistor is, of coursel dependent on environmental fluctuations such as temperature variation, voltage variation and ambient noise. The reliability of a PUF is therefore a question mark. Rather than using absolute delays that can vary significantly with enviroiiinental changes, we use relative delay cornpansons in our PUFs. As we will demonstrate, this dramatically improves t o the reliability of PUFs, and they stay reliable even under significant temperature and voltage variation.
Previous researches have proposed thc addition of specific circuits that produce uniquc rcsponscs duc to manufacturing variation of MOSFET drain currents such that ICs can be identified [6] . However, these t.echniques focus simply on assigning one unique identifier to each chip without having security in mind. Therefore, they can be applied to identify an IC, but not to authenticate it. In our approach, a P U F has exponentially large number of unique challenge-response pairs, from which a lock can randomly choose a pair t o authenticate the key.
To summarize, in this paper we explore the possibility of a PUF to be a viable alternative to a digital key stored in on-chip non-volatile memory. The paper is organized a s follows. First, we present a candidate implementation of PUFI followed by the security issues including possible attacks to break its security. Then we provide experimental results with fabricated P U F test chips to quantitatively evaluate the security and reliability of the implenientation. Finally, the last section summarizes our work. C i r c u i t Implementation 'Experiments on a PUF prototypcd on a self-oscillating loop using FPGAs were described in [4] . this implementation, we excite two delay paths simultancously and make the transitions race against each other. Then the arbiter block at the output determines which rising edgc arrives first and sets its output to 0 or 1 depending nu the winner. This circuit takes an n-bit challenge (b?) as an input to configure the delay paths and generates a onc-bit response as an output. In our tcst chip, n is 64. 
This block interconnccts its two input ports ( i o and i l )
to thc output ports (00 and 01) with diffcrcnt configurations depending on the control bit ( b i ) ; for b,=O the paths go straight through, while for bi=l they are crossed. It is simply implemented with a pair of 2-to-1 inuxes and buffcrs. For the arbiter, we used a simple transparent latch with an active-low enable input in our test chip. (We note that this arbit,er favors the path to output 0 becausc it is preset to 0 and requires a setup time constraint to switch to 1. This skcw was cornpeusated for by fixing a small number of most significant challenge bits to effectively lengthen the path for 0.) If the racing paths are symmetric in the layout regardless of the challenge bits and the arbiter is not biased to either path, a response is equally likely t o be 0 or 1; and its value is deterrnincd only by the statistical dclay variation in the fahricatcd ICs. Consequently, wc wish to have paths to be as symmetric as possible to give a PUF enough randomness to function as a security primitive.
In our test chip; we carefully placed and routed the cells: for symmetric paths, and also so that the wires on the delay circuits effectively cover the entire chip. This layout technique makes it extremely hard for a 1 1 adversary to probe the internal nodes to read out a logic value without breaking the PUF, i.e., without changing the delays of wircs or transistors. S e c u r i t y of Arbiter-based PUF There are at least two requirements for P U F to be a viable alternativc to a digital key -security and reliability. For security, measurable delay variation must be large enough to distinguish chips fabricated with the same technology, masks, and even on the same wafer. If there is vcry little random variation of delay across ICs, an adversary can easily predict the behavior of a specific P U F either by fabricating another IC or by building a model for it, rcsulting in duplication of the key.
For reliability, the response of the circuit to a given challenge should be consistcnt for repeated measurements over a practical range of environmental variation such as temperature and power supply voltage. Otherwise, even with a valid key we would have difficulties in checking its authenticity.
The most plausible attacks are described below.
1. An adversary could attempt to clone a P U F by exlisustively enumerating all challenge-response pairs, but this requires applying an exponentially large riumber of challenges and observing their responses.
2. An adversary can attempt to fabricate a counterfeit PUF that produces exactly the same responses as the original PUF for all challenges. However, if there is enough process variation that cannot be easily controlled or eliminated by manufacturers, he will have to fabricate a huge number of ICs.
3.
An advcrsary can open up the package of a PUF chip and attempt to measure device delays of the circuit by probing or monitoring internal devices. Then he may use these nieasurcd delays i m a sophisticated tim-,ing model to predict thc behavior of the circuit to a given random challenge. However, probing wit,h surficient precision is likely to be very difficult because interaction betwecn the probe and the circuit will directly infliieuce the behavior of the circuit. Besides, any damage on the delay paths affects capacitive coupling between wircs to change delay characteristics, effectively destroying the PUF key.
4.
Non-invasive model building attacks are also possible. First, an adversary can use a publicly available mask description of I C j P U F to build a timingaccurate model with a polynomial number of parameters. Thcn, he can apply many random or chosen challengcs. and monitor the responses to calculate those parametcrs. If his model can prcdict the response of a real chip with a very high probability, it breaks the security of PUF by building a "virtual counterfeit." In case that the modeling attack
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p Fig. 3 . Adding unknown challenge bits using Seed-forward arbiters (feed-forward arbiter scheme). 
A . Interchip Variation
To quantify the dclay variation across ICs, we define the interchip variation (7) as the probability that the first measured responsc for a given challenge on a first chip is different from the first measured response for the same challcngc on a second chip. Wc call these first measured responses reference responses.
To reduce the measurement noise, the PUF computes each response as the majority out of 11 repeated measurements. In this set up, we used 37 test chips to estimate T z 23% for the basic arbiter scheme. For the feed-forward arbiter scheme, T increases to 40%.
B. Reliability
To be useful: a PUF should reliably generate thc same response for a given challcnge. Unfortunately. cnvironmcntal variations, instahilitics in the circuit, and aging may cause a P U F to produce a response different from the reference response. To quantify the effect of these variations, we define the noise ( p ) as the probability that a newly measured response is different from the c o r r c sponding reference response. First, temperature or supply voltage variations can significantly change the circuit delay, and lead to uncxpccted responses. In fact, the delay variations due to environmental variations can be orders of magnitude larger than the manufacturaing variations.
Fortunately, the arbiter-based PUF is very robust to environmental variations hccause the response relies on the difference of delays between two adjacent paths, instead of their absolute values. consequently, thc response remains consistent unless the faster path becomes slower. Figure 4 shows the amount of noise introduced by the temperature ( p t ) and voltage variations ( p u ) for the basic 27 dcgrccs Celsius and 1.8V powcr supply voltage. The noise is evaluated using 10000 challenges. Even if the temperature increases 40 degrees t o 67 degrees Celsius, pt zz 4.8%. Also, with * 2% power supply voltage mriation: pu zz 3.7%. Both pLt and fiLu are well below the interchip mriation of 23%.
Second, a PUF response may change due t o variations within the circuit even without environmental variation, which is called measurement noise ( p m ) . For example, junction temperatures or internal voltages may slightly fluctuate as the circnit opcrates, and change the delay characteristics. For some challenges, a setup time violation for the arbiter latch may lead to an unpredictable response. In the reference environment, we estimated pm zz 0.7% for the basic arbiter scheme and pm i ; : 2.2%
for the feed-forward arhiter scheme.
Finally, aging may change the P U F characteristics. Electromigration and hot-carrier effects cause long-term degradation of the reliability of interconnccts and transistors [ 3 ] . In most applications, the PUF circuits will age much slower than other processing elements because they only get activated to generate a sccret. While we believe that the effect of aging is not a major problem compared with the environmental variations, we plan to run longterm aging experiments whose results are not available at this t.ime.
C. Modeling Complezity
Currently, for the basic arbiter scheme, our hest noninvasive model building attack achieves about 97% accuracy in predicting the response of a given random challenge using a machine learning algorithm. Note that the error rate of 3% is still significantly higher than pm x 0.7% but that it is less than pt or p,,. This means that the basic arbiter scheme can only be uscd for authentication purposes in the reference environment.
The feed-forward arbiter scheme appears to have significantly higher modeling complexity due to the nonlinearitics introduced by the additional arbiters. So far, we have not been able to find a successful modeling attack that results in accurate predictions.
D. Identzficution/Authentication Cupability
Given the interchip variation r and noise f i , we can estimate the identification/authentication capability of the proposed PUF implementation. First, the probability that at least 2t -t 1 out of k reference responses diffcr between two chips is equal to For a single chip, the probability that at most t out of k responses differ from the corresponding reference responses is
From (1) and (2), the probability of being able to identify N chips using a set of k challengcs is at least3
For the basic arbiter scheme in a constant environment, 
E. Perfomance
For a given 64-bit challenge, it takes an order of 50 ns for an input rising edge to transmit across the 64-stage parameterized delay circuit and evaluate an output a t the arbiter4. Therefore, if we want to generate 1100 CRPs to distinguish 1 billion chips for the basic arbiter scheme, it takes abont 55 ps. This is fast enough for most applications since a PUF is evaluated infrequently only to obtain a secret. Wc can also boost the performance by replicating multiple dday paths and arbiters and evaluate the responses in parallel.
Conclusion
\Ve proposed a candidate implementation of PUF; fabricated it, and investigated its security and reliability. Each chip measures at most t responses corrupted by measurement noise with probability b. Hence, with probability aN(N--1)12b'v, any two chips do not agree on at least one (equals (2t + 1) niiniis two times t) measured response and can be identified from one another.
'This delay corresponds to 500-800 F04 delay depending on the Therc are N chips.
SO"IC-SS.
The test chip was built in TSMC's 0.18 fim: single-poly, 6-level metal process with standard cells, whose die photo is shown in Figure 5 . It contains 8 sets of the arbiter circuit generating an 8-bit response for a challenge and a JTAG-like serial interfacc, and measures a total area of 1212 p m x 1212 p m . It operates a t 100 h4Hz. Our eva,luatiori indicates that there exists significant delay variation of wires and transistors across ICs implementing this circuit, and that the idea of leveraging this variation to uniqucly identify and authenticate an IC is promising. However, there are open issues that should he addressed for PUFs to be deployed in real applications. For exaniplc, it should be shown to be resistant against inore elaborate modeling and other types of attacks, and additional reliability issues (e.g., the effects of aging) should be resolved. 
